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We provide empirical evidence on the dynamics effects of tax liability changes in the United States.
We distinguish between surprise and anticipated tax changes using a timing-convention. We document
that pre-announced but not yet implemented tax cuts give rise to contractions in output, investment
and hours worked while real wages increase. In contrast, there are no significant anticipation effects
on aggregate consumption. Implemented tax cuts, regardless of their timing, have expansionary and
persistent effects on output, consumption, investment, hours worked and real wages. Results are shown
to be very robust. We argue that tax shocks are empirically important impulses to the U.S. business









morten.ravn@eui.eu1I n t r o d u c t i o n
This paper estimates the dynamic macroeconomic eﬀects of tax changes in the United States for the
post World War II period. We take into account the timing of tax changes by introducing a distinction
between anticipated and unanticipated changes in taxes. According to economic theory, agents
base their decision rules upon their current information about variables relevant for the decision
problem. Unanticipated changes in taxes aﬀect behavior when the tax changes are implemented,
while anticipated changes in taxes may aﬀect the economy ahead of their introduction. The idea
that anticipated policy shocks impact on the economy prior to their implementation has been explored
extensively in the literature on ﬁscal policy, see e.g. Hall, 1971, Auerbach, 1989, Yang, 2005, and
House and Shapiro, 2006, for the case of tax shocks, or Blanchard, 1981, Taylor, 1993, and Ramey,
2008, for the case of government spending shocks. Yet, there is little if any direct empirical evidence
that anticipation eﬀects are empirically relevant. This paper provides such evidence for the U.S.
economy. Moreover, by explicitly taking the timing of tax changes into account, we are better able
to estimate the impact of implemented tax changes than preexisting studies.
Our analysis is based upon a narrative account measurement of tax changes. Speciﬁcally, we
adopt the narrative account of post World War II legislated federal U.S. tax bills provided by Romer
and Romer (2007, 2008). We focus upon those tax changes that Romer and Romer (2008) classify
as exogenous because they were introduced either for ideological reasons or because they were moti-
v a t e db y“ i n h e r i t e dd e ﬁcit concerns” (as opposed to deﬁcits caused by current spending). There are
70 such tax liability changes that derive from 35 diﬀerent federal tax policy acts. The distinction be-
tween anticipated and unanticipated tax shocks is accomplished by introducing a timing convention.
We deﬁne for each tax act the announcement date and the implementation date of the tax liability
changes. The announcement date is assumed to correspond to the date at which the policy inter-
vention became law while the implementation date is deﬁned as the date at which the tax liability
changes were to be implemented according to the tax acts. When these dates are no longer than 90
days apart, we classify the corresponding tax liability change as an unanticipated tax shock, while
anticipated tax shocks are those changes in taxes for which the two dates diﬀer by more than 90 days.
Based on this measurement, 37 out of the 70 tax liability changes are categorized as anticipated and
the median anticipation horizon amongst these tax shocks is 6 quarters.
1The use of this timing convention provides a methodological innovation to the problem of esti-
mating anticipation eﬀects in the macroeconomic literature on ﬁscal policy. Alternatively, Blanchard
and Perotti (2002) suggest the use of an instrumental variables estimator. These authors identify
ﬁscal shocks by exploiting the existence of decision lags assuming that ﬁscal policy variables do not
adjust within a quarter to other unanticipated shocks but point out that decision lags need to exceed
implementation lags if there are pre-announced tax changes. Since the median implementation lag
in our data is 6 quarters, this approach would therefore have to rely on unrealistically long reaction
lags when estimating the dynamic impact of unanticipated and anticipated tax shocks.1
We estimate the impact of the tax shocks on main macroeconomic aggregates using a VAR
approach treating the tax liability changes as exogenous shocks. This approach is akin to analyses
that have examined the impact of government spending shocks using the narrative approach (e.g.
Ramey and Shapiro, 1998, Burnside, Eichenbaum and Fisher, 2004, or Ramey, 2008) with the added
feature that we distinguish between anticipated and unanticipated ﬁscal shocks. The key ﬁndings
are:
• An unanticipated tax cut gives rise to signiﬁcant increases in output, consumption, and invest-
ment which peak around 2.5 years after the introduction of the tax cut. The largest response
relates to investment that after a 1 percent tax cut increases by approximately 10 percent at
peak. Hours worked also increases but only gradually over time. Real wages rise persistently.
• An anticipated tax cut is associated with pre-implementation drops in output and investment
while consumption remains roughly constant during the pre-implementation period. Once the
tax change is implemented, it is associated with a stimulating eﬀect on the economy. There is
also a signiﬁcant pre-implementation drop in hours worked, while real wages increase during
the pre-implementation period.
• Unanticipated and anticipated tax shocks have contributed importantly to the U.S. business
cycle. In particular, the anticipation eﬀects associated with the Social Security Amendments
1Mountford and Uhlig (2009) estimate the impact of pre-announced ﬁscal policy shocks using a structural VAR ap-
proach where identiﬁcation is obtained by imposing sign restrictions. They do not show, however, whether anticipation
eﬀects have been important quantitively for ﬂuctuations in the U.S. economy. Mertens and Ravn (2010b) propose an
alternative structural VAR estimator which applies Blaschke matrices to correct for anticipation eﬀects.
2of 1977 and the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981 explain a signiﬁcant proportion of the
1981-82 recession and the mid-1980’s boom in the U.S. The Bush tax initiatives in the early
2000’s also had important anticipation eﬀects. Tax shocks account for around 20-25 percent of
the volatility of output at business cycle frequencies.
In contrast to preexisting studies, our results provide direct empirical evidence on the impor-
tance of anticipation eﬀects. A number of papers have examined the consumption response to
pre-announced changes in personal taxes. Poterba (1988) tests whether aggregate U.S. consumption
reacts to announcements of future tax changes and fails to ﬁnd robust evidence in favor of this hy-
pothesis.2 Heim (2007) studies data from the Consumer Expenditure Survey (CEX) and tests for
announcement eﬀects of state tax rebates. He ﬁnds no signiﬁcant household consumption response
to rebate announcements. Parker (1999) and Souleles (1999, 2002) also study CEX data and test
whether household consumption responds to actual changes in taxes when these were known in ad-
vance of their implementation.3 They ﬁnd that consumption plans adjust only when tax changes
are implemented. Our results regarding the impact of taxes on consumption agree with these stud-
ies but indicate that other key macroeconomic variables do display signiﬁcant anticipation eﬀects.
This is important because the existing evidence on pre-announcement eﬀects on consumption has
been interpreted in terms of lack of foresight on the part of households and/or binding liquidity
constraints. We argue that the drop in hours worked and the increase in investment in response to
announcements of future tax cuts indicate forward looking behavior and are hard to reconcile with
large shares of liquidity constrained agents.
We carry out an extensive robustness analysis. We ﬁrst examine reliability of the timing-based
measurement of anticipated tax shocks. Speciﬁcally, we allow leads of surprise tax changes to aﬀect
the vector of observables which should be the case if the public had good knowledge of tax changes
prior to them becoming law. We ﬁnd little evidence to indicate that surprise tax changes systemat-
ically have any impact before their implementation which supports the timing-based measurement
2Poterba (1988) identiﬁes ﬁve such episodes: February 1964, June 1968, March 1975, August 1981, and August
1986.
3Parker (1999) examines the impact of Social Security changes during the 1980’s while Souleles (2002) investigates
the Reagan tax cut of the early 1980’s.
3of anticipated tax shocks.
Secondly, we investigate whether our results are driven by endogeneity of the tax shocks. We
examine the predictability of the tax changes using an ordered probit model distinguishing between
surprise and anticipated tax changes and taking into account the motivation for their introduction.
We cannot reject exogeneity of tax changes that were introduced for ideological reasons. The results
for deﬁcit driven tax changes are less clear with some mild (but not very strong) evidence indicating
predictability of announcements of future deﬁcit driven tax liability changes. Although the evidence
on endogeneity is weak, we repeat our analysis eliminating all deﬁcit driven tax changes from the
data but ﬁnd that this does not overturn any of the main results. We also investigate whether the
estimation results hinge critically on particular tax laws. We remove three particularly large tax
interventions the Reagan tax cut being the most prominent. We show that the results are robust to
removing any of these three tax acts.
Finally, we ask whether our results are contaminated by lack of control for monetary policy and for
ﬁscal spending which might be an important issue in small samples. Our results become perhaps even
stronger when we control for monetary policy shocks or for government spending shocks. Moreover,
our ﬁnding that the anticipation eﬀects associated with the Reagan tax cut were partially responsible
for the early 1980’s recession in the US holds true even when we control for monetary policy shocks.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes our estimation approach
and discusses the tax data. Section 3 contains the main results regarding the dynamic eﬀects of tax
shocks. A substantial robustness analysis is discussed in Section 4. Section 5 contains our analysis
of the role of tax shocks for US business cycles. Finally, Section 6 concludes and summarizes.
2 Estimation Approach
In this section we discuss how we measure tax shocks and our approach to the estimation of their
impact on macroeconomic aggregates.
2.1 Identiﬁcation
Key to any estimation of the impact of ﬁscal policy shocks is the identiﬁcation strategy. Recent
contributions to the ﬁscal policy literature have adopted either structural VAR approaches or have
4relied upon narrative approaches. We follow the second identiﬁcation strategy. The key advantage
of the narrative approach is that it allows us to make a distinction between anticipated and unantici-
pated tax shocks based on timing assumptions and therefore, at least partially, to control for ex-ante
available information about future changes in taxes that is usually ignored in standard VAR based
methods.4 Speciﬁcally, we make use of Romer and Romer’s (2007) (updated in Romer and Romer,
2008) narrative account of U.S. federal tax liability changes. Based on oﬃcial government documents,
presidential speeches, and Congressional documents, these authors identify 51 signiﬁcant legislated
federal tax acts in the period 1947-2006 and a total of 110 separate changes in tax liabilities. This
account is therefore much richer than the standard narrative account of ﬁscal spending (Ramey and
Shapiro, 1998).
We focus on the tax liability changes that Romer and Romer (2007) classify as exogenous since
“(t)he changes were not motivated by current or projected economic conditions” (Romer and Romer,
2007, p.3). This includes tax liability changes that Romer and Romer (2007) classify as either
“exogenous due to long-term growth objectives” or exogenous due to “deﬁcit concerns”. The former
of these are tax changes that were introduced with no explicit concerns about the current state of
the economy while the latter are tax changes introduced to address inherited budget deﬁcits. Our
benchmark estimates of the impact of these tax shocks includes all of these tax liability changes but
we later examine in some detail whether there are signs of endogeneity of the tax liability changes.
This selection leaves us with 70 tax liability changes deriving from 35 diﬀerent federal tax policy acts
listed in Table A.1.
2.2 Distinguishing Between Anticipated and Unanticipated Tax Shocks
We adopt a timing based distinction between unanticipated and anticipated tax shocks. For each
tax liability change we deﬁne two dates, the announcement date and the implementation date. We
assume that the announcement date corresponds to the date at which the tax legislation became
law, i.e. when it was signed by the President. The implementation date is instead the date at which,
4Blanchard and Perotti (2002) point out that allowing for anticipated shocks in a structural VAR framework where
identiﬁcation of ﬁscal policy shocks rests upon decision lags implies the need for using instrumental variables estimators
and assuming decision lags that exceed announcement lags.
5according to each tax legislation, the tax liability changes were to be introduced.5 We refer to the
diﬀerence between these two dates as the implementation lag.
Figure 1 illustrates the histogram of the implementation lag (in days) in the data. It is evident
that the histogram of the implementation lag is twin peaked with the peaks occurring at 0-30 days
and at more than 151 days. Only 18 of the 70 tax liability changes have implementation lags in the
30-150 days interval. In our benchmark analysis we deﬁne a tax liability change as anticipated if the
implementation lag exceeds 90 days which strikes a balance between robustness of the classiﬁcation
to the timing within a quarter and the ability to measure anticipation eﬀects. The twin peaked
nature of the frequency of the implementation lag implies that minor changes in the width of the
w i n d o wh a v el i t t l ei m p a c t .
Based on this deﬁnition, 36 out of the 70 of the tax liability changes are anticipated while 34 tax
liability changes are deﬁned as surprise tax shocks. The resulting tax shocks are illustrated in Figure
2 in percentages of annual current price GDP. The top panel shows the unanticipated shocks, the
middle panel shows the anticipated shocks dated by the quarter of implementation, and the bottom
panel reports the anticipation horizon of the anticipated tax shocks (truncated at 4 years).
As is evident, the tax liability changes are quite frequent and some of them are quite large. The
Reagan tax initiative, the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981 (ERTA 1981 from now on), signed by
Reagan in August 1981, contained a substantial amount of pre-announced tax changes. It consisted
of ﬁve separate changes in tax liabilities due in 1981:3, 1981:4, 1982:1, 1983:1, and 1984:1. The
ﬁrst two tax changes are deﬁned as surprise changes according to our taxonomy while the last three
initiatives are deﬁned as anticipated policy changes. The change in tax liabilities of these latter three
anticipated changes corresponds to approximately 4.5 percent of annual GDP. This sequence of tax
cuts as a whole constitutes by far the largest anticipated tax changes in the sample that we study.
The median implementation lag in the data is 6 quarters while the longest implementation lag is
associated with the Social Security Amendments of 1983 signed by Reagan in April 1983 which had
tax liability changes being introduced as far out in the future as 1990. Most other pre-announced
5When the tax bill is advanced by the President, the bill becomes law when passed by the Congress. This date may
occur slightly earlier than the bill being signed by the President. However, given that we introduce a 90 day minimum
anticipation horizon, this detail should not aﬀect our results.
6tax changes, however, had implementation lags close to the median lag (only 5 tax changes have
anticipation lags longer than 4 years).
The timing based distinction between surprise and anticipated changes in taxes is parallel to the
approach taken in microeconometric estimates of the impact of pre-announced tax changes on house-
hold consumption (Heim, 2007, Parker, 1999, Souleles, 1999, 2002) and in Poterba’s classic (1988)
study of the aggregate consumption response to tax announcements. One might consider taking
into account promises made during election campaigns, lags in the democratic process of passing tax
legislations, etc. to arrive at more sophisticated measurements of the arrival of information about
future tax interventions. The advantage of the approach taken here is that the measurement is con-
sistent across all tax liability changes and it is easily reproducible. Nevertheless, in the robustness
analysis we take a closer look at the plausibility of this assumption.
Another issue relates to the timing of the announcements of anticipated tax shocks. Suppose
that the announcements were systematically related to the state of the business cycle. In this case,
while the motivation for the tax changes may not be related to current economic conditions, the
timing of their introduction may reﬂect concerns about the state of the economy. To check this, we
computed the average number of quarters between announcements of future tax changes and the
closest NBER business cycle turning point. This statistic is 5.7 quarters in the data. Assuming that
tax announcements are random so that they occur with the same probability at all dates gives an
expected value of this statistic of 5.8 quarters. Thus, we ﬁnd no signs of a systematic relationship
between announcements of future tax changes and business cycle turning points.
2.3 Measurement of Tax Shocks
We measure the size of surprise tax liability changes, denoted as τu
t , as the implied dollar change in
tax liabilities in percent of current price GDP at the implementation date. This tax measure converts
the tax liability change into an average tax rate. It would potentially be interesting to disaggregate
this measure into changes in speciﬁc taxes but we concentrate on the coarser measure since it gives
us a rich amount of data to examine.
Anticipated tax changes are distinguished by size, the announcement date, and by the anticipation
horizon. Let s
a,i
t denote tax liability changes that were signed by the President at date t and had
7an anticipation horizon of i quarters measured as a percentage of GDP at the implementation date.
Ideally, we would like to allow for diﬀerential eﬀects of tax liabilities that had diﬀerent anticipation
horizons but this is infeasible due to the loss of degrees of freedom implied by the large number of
tax shocks that needs to be included. To see this, note that adopting this approach implies that the










where M denotes the largest implementation lag in the data. For M =2 0 , the largest anticipation
horizon in the data, 210 parameters need to be estimating leaving only a tiny degrees of freedom
available for estimating of the impact of tax changes.
To address this issue, we distinguish between anticipated tax shocks on the basis of their remaining









t,i measures the sum of all anticipated tax liability changes known at date t to be imple-
mented at date t + i. Using this deﬁnition of the anticipated tax shocks implies that the number of
anticipated tax variables that enter the information set at date t is equal to M, making estimation
feasible.
2.4 Estimating the Impact of Tax Liability Changes
Given the estimates and classiﬁcation of the tax shocks, we estimate the impact of tax shocks on the
basis of impulse response functions. These impulse response functions are derived from the following
regression model:
Xt = A + Bt+ C (L)Xt−1 + D(L)τu





t,i + et (2)
where Xt is a vector of endogenous variables, A and B control for a constant term and a linear
trend, C(L) is P-order lag polynomial, and D(L) and F(L) are (R +1 ) -order lag polynomials.6 We
allow the maximum anticipation horizon in equation (2), K, potentially to diﬀer from the maximum
implementation lag observed in the data, M. The anticipation eﬀects of pre-announced tax liability
changes are introduced through the terms G1−GK. Notice that, since these coeﬃcients enter on the
6The results are robust to allowing for a break in the trend in 1973:2, see Ramey and Shapiro (1998) and Burnside,
Eichenbaum and Fisher (2004). The results are also robust to ﬁrst diﬀerencing the Xt vector.
8tax liability changes that are part of the information set at date t but not yet implemented, these
terms directly measure news eﬀects associated with anticipated tax shocks. Therefore, the empirical
model allows us to trace out the dynamics of the economy from when tax changes are announced.
The regression model can be viewed as a vector autoregression for Xt, treating the tax variables
as exogenous shocks. Since we do not include actual tax rates in the vector Xt, in order to allow for
persistence in the tax liability changes the VAR includes moving average terms of implemented tax
liability changes, τu
t and τa
t,0 (the D(L) and F(L) lag polynomials).
A main motivation for the formulation of the regression model is that it corresponds to an
approximation to the dynamics of the observables in a DSGE model with stochastic shocks to tax
rates, see Mertens and Ravn (2010a). We explain this in Appendix 2. The approximation consists of
restricting D(L) and F(L) to be ﬁnite order polynomials (as opposed to inﬁnite order polynomials).
Mertens and Ravn (2010a) show that as long as R is suﬃciently high, the approximation is quite
precise and that the VAR provides a very good ﬁt of the dynamics of a DSGE model.
Our treatment of the tax shocks contrasts with the standard “dummy variable” measurement
of the policy interventions usually adopted in the narrative approach, see e.g. Ramey and Shapiro
(1998) or Burnside, Eichenbaum and Fisher (2004).7 The advantage of our approach is that it allows
us to aggregate the evidence across diﬀerent episodes of tax liability changes. This seems a sensible
strategy given that we have quite a large number of tax shocks, and given that their measurement
can be interpreted in terms of changes in average taxes.
We study U.S. quarterly data for the sample period 1947:1 - 2006:4. In all our experiments, the





where yt denotes the logarithm of U.S. GDP per adult in constant (chained) prices, ct is the logarithm
of the real per capita private sector consumption expenditure, it is the logarithm of real aggregate per
capita gross private sector investment (see Appendix 2 for precise deﬁnitions and data sources). We
also estimate the impact of the tax shocks on hours worked and on real wages by adding these variables
sequentially to the vector of observables. This strategy requires the estimation of a fewer number
7See Perotti (2007) for an insightful discussion of the narrative approach to ﬁscal policy.
9of parameters than estimating the larger dimensional VAR directly, see also Burnside, Eichenbaum
and Fisher (2004).8
The VAR above assumes that the tax shocks have persistent but non-permanent eﬀects on the
vector of observables (under the condition that the lag-polynomial C (L) does not contain unit roots).
We also checked the results when allowing for permanent eﬀects of the tax shocks using a VAR in
ﬁrst diﬀerences. The results are very similar to those that we derive with the VAR in equation (2)
and are therefore not reported.
3 Empirical Results
We assume that K =6which corresponds to the median implementation lag in the data that we
study, that R =1 2 ,a n dt h a tP =1(the results are robust to assuming longer lag structures). We
report the impulse response functions to a 1 percent decrease in the tax liabilities (relative to GDP)
along with 68 percent non-parametric non-centered bootstrapped conﬁdence intervals computed from
10000 replications.9 The impulse response functions are shown for a forecast horizon of 24 quarters
for unanticipated tax liability shocks, and for 6 quarters before its implementation, to 24 quarters
thereafter in the case of anticipated shocks.
3.1 Benchmark Results
Figure 3 reports the benchmark results. We discuss ﬁrst the impact of an unanticipated tax cut
s h o w ni nt h el e f tc o l u m no ft h eﬁgure. A surprise tax cut sets oﬀ a major expansion of the economy.
According to our estimates, a 1 percent tax cut is associated with a 2 percent peak increase in
GDP per capita. The increase in output occurs gradually over time with the peak being reached
10 quarters after the cut in taxes. Thereafter, output remains above trend for an extended period
that goes beyond the 6 years forecast horizon illustrated in Figure 3. The increase in output is
signiﬁcantly positive at all but the second and third quarter and the conﬁdence interval is narrow at
all forecast horizons.
8Mertens and Ravn (2008) estimate a larger dimensional VAR which also includes consumer durables. The results
are for al intents and purposes identical to those reported here.
9We report 68 percent conﬁdence intervals due to the use of a non-parametric bootstrap.
10Private sector consumption also increases and the size of its peak response is similar to the size
of the peak response of output, corresponding to a 2 percent increase above trend. Consumption,
however, tends to increase slightly faster than output, and 6 years after the tax cut, consumption
is still around 0.75 percent above trend. The increase in consumption is signiﬁcantly positive at all
forecast horizons.
By far the most elastic response is associated with private sector investment, which we estimate
to increase by as much as 10 percent relative to its trend. As for output, the peak increase occurs
10 quarters after the cut in taxes. This indicates a large supply side impact of tax changes. One
noticeable feature of the investment dynamics is that while its peak response is much larger than
that of output and consumption, the response is also signiﬁcantly less persistent. Such dynamics
of investment would appear consistent with standard model of capital accumulation if tax changes
aﬀect directly the return on capital.
The impact on hours worked, instead, is estimated to be close to zero until around a year and a
half after the change in taxes. After that, hours worked increases gradually and its peak response,
which occurs 10 quarters after the tax cut, corresponds to approximately a 1 percent increase above
trend. This gradual increase in hours worked indicates a much less signiﬁcant labor market impact
of tax shocks than the impact on goods markets. Another aspect of the labor market impact is the
eﬀect on real wages. The real wage response to ﬁscal policy shocks is often seen as a litmus test of
business cycle theories because it reﬂects the movements in labor supply relative to labor demand.
We ﬁnd that (before tax) real wages rise gradually but very persistently after a cut in taxes.
Our estimates of the impact of unanticipated tax liability changes on output are similar to the
univariate results of Romer and Romer (2010) and to the impact of a “basic government revenue
shock” estimated by Mountford and Uhlig (2009). Relative to the estimates of Blanchard and Perotti
(2002), the response of output to tax liability shocks occurs more gradually than their structural
VAR estimate. However, our results are similar to theirs in terms of the persistence of the output
response.
The right column of Figure 3 illustrates the impulse responses to an anticipated tax cut assum-
i n ga6q u a r t e ra n t i c i p a t i o np e r i o d . W eﬁnd strong evidence of anticipation eﬀects. During the
pre-implementation period, an anticipated tax cut gives rise to signiﬁcant declines in output, invest-
11ment, and in hours worked. The drop in aggregate output reaches its maximum 1 year before the
implementation of the tax cut where output is estimated to be 1.5 percent below trend. The most
dramatic anticipation eﬀects relate to the impact on aggregate investment which drops 4 percent
below trend 4 quarters before the tax cut is implemented. The anticipation eﬀect on hours worked
is also very pronounced, with hours worked falling 2 percent below trend and remaining below trend
throughout the pre-implementation period.
The eﬀects of the tax cut announcement on consumption and real wages are quite diﬀerent from
the eﬀects on output, investment and hours worked. We ﬁnd that the real wage if anything increases
during the pre-implementation period, while consumption remains roughly unaﬀected by the tax
announcement apart from a temporary drop 5 quarters before the tax cut is implemented. The
impact on real wages makes it unlikely that the estimates are signiﬁcantly contaminated by the lack
of control for other structural shocks such as monetary policy shocks, a point that we will return to.
Once taxes are cut, the dynamics of the variables resemble the dynamics that follow after an
unanticipated tax cut. Peak eﬀects, however, occur slightly earlier for anticipated tax cuts. Output
starts rising 3 quarters after the tax cut is implemented and reaches a peak increase that corresponds
to a 1.5 percent rise above trend 8 quarters after the implementation of the tax cut. Investment
reaches a 10 percent peak rise over trend 9 quarters after the implementation date. Hours worked
rise slowly but eventually expands 1 percent above trend one year after the tax cut is implemented
while the increase in the real wage during the pre-implementation period persists after taxes are cut.
The lack of an anticipation eﬀect on consumption is in line with previous estimates in the liter-
ature. Poterba (1988) and Heim (2007) ﬁnd no signiﬁcant consumption response to announcements
of future tax changes while Parker (1999) and Souleles (2002) ﬁnd that consumption reacts to the
implementation of pre-announced tax changes. According to our results the lack of anticipation
eﬀects on consumption is not indicative of the absence of adjustments to announcement of changes
in future taxes since we ﬁnd strong pre-implementation eﬀects on output, investment, and hours
worked. Romer and Romer (2010), in contrast, ﬁnd only mild evidence of expectational eﬀects when
examining whether the expected present value of future not yet implemented tax changes aﬀects the
current level of aggregate GDP. A main diﬀerence between their approach and ours is that while
we control for the anticipation horizon, Romer and Romer (20010) examine whether the present
12value of future tax changes aﬀect current output regardless of their remaining anticipation lag of the
pre-announced tax changes. It is hard to see that there are any reasons for why for example a tax
change 2 quarters out in the future should have the same impact as, say, a tax change 6 quarters out
in the future. Our results shows quite clearly that there are important anticipation eﬀects when we
take into account the anticipation horizon.10
Mountford and Uhlig (2009) identify the impact of a pre-announced government revenue shock
using an “ex-post” identiﬁcation approach based on sign restrictions. In particular, they examine
the impact of a government tax revenue shock that takes place one year out in the future with the
restriction that the shock is orthogonal to “business cycle” shocks and monetary policy shocks. In
contrast to our ﬁndings, they ﬁnd that a pre-announced revenue increase is associated with a pre-
implementation increase in output, while their estimates of the impact on investment agree with
our results. Their identiﬁcation strategy is fundamentally diﬀerent from ours as they do not include
currently available information about future tax liability changes. For that reason, it is perhaps not
surprising that they ﬁnd a diﬀerent impact of pre-announced ﬁscal policy shocks.11
Our results appear consistent with strong supply side eﬀects of tax changes. The strong decline
in investment and the drop in hours worked in response to a pre-announced tax cut is consistent
with the idea that future lower taxes motivate ﬁrms to delay purchases of capital goods and gives
rise to intertemporal substitution of labor supply. Indeed, Mertens and Ravn (2010a) show that a
DSGE model can account quite precisely for the dynamics of output, investment, and hours worked
that follow after unanticipated and anticipated changes in taxes. At the same time, the results do
not appear easily compatible with the idea that the lack of consumption response to announcements
10There are several other diﬀerences between our analysis and that of Romer and Romer (2010). We control for
the interrelationships between the vector of endogenous variables, while Romer and Romer (2010) carry out univariate
regressions. Our analysis allows for a diﬀerent impact of implemented changes in unanticipated and anticipated tax
shocks while Romer and Romer (2010) restrict these to have identical impact apart from the possible impact of lagged
news.
11Moreover, as discussed by Leeper, Walker and Yang (2008), their identiﬁcation is applied to government tax
revenue rather than to tax liabilities relative to GDP. They assume that government revenue remains constant from
the announcement date until the implementation date. Thus, to the extent that tax revenue is derived from income
taxation, the pre-implementation increase in output that they estimate in response to a future tax revenue increase
implies that tax rates must adjust during the pre-implementation period.
13of future tax changes can be interpreted as evidence of a signiﬁcant share of liquidity constrained
households. In particular, one would think that the ensuing increase in real wages would stimulate
liquidity constrained households to work harder and therefore increase their consumption. For those
reasons, we believe that the results of our exercise are important for understanding better the impact
of ﬁscal policy shocks and for the development of macroeconomic theory.
3.2 Sensitivity to the Anticipation Horizon
The above analysis assumes pre-announced tax changes can impact on Xt from a maximum of 6
quarters before their implementation. This length of the anticipation period corresponds to the
median anticipation lag in the data. However, there is quite some variation in the anticipation lags
and it is therefore interesting to examine how the results depend on the assumed anticipation horizon.
Figure 4 illustrates the impact of an anticipated tax liability cut on aggregate GDP when we vary
the maximum anticipation horizon, between 4 and 10 quarters. In each case, we reestimate equation
(2) for K =4 , 6, 8, 10, and then plot the resulting impulse response function. Regardless of the
assumed anticipation horizon, the pre-implementation period is characterized by a drop in output
and, once the tax cut is implemented, the tax cut stimulates the economy. However, the depth of the
pre-implementation downturn and the size of the post-implementation expansion are sensitive to K.
In particular, the longer the assumed maximum anticipation horizon (within reasonable limits), the
deeper is the pre-implementation downturn and the milder is the post-implementation expansion.12
These results reconcile our ﬁndings with those of Blanchard and Perotti (2002) who ﬁnd little
evidence of anticipation eﬀects, but allow only for a one quarter anticipation horizon. Our estimates
indicate that for longer, and empirically relevant anticipation horizons, there are signiﬁcant pre-
implementation eﬀects of pre-announced tax liability changes.
3.3 Anticipation Eﬀects of Surprise Tax Changes
The timing convention that we adopt to identify anticipated tax changes is based on the diﬀerence
between the dates at which tax laws were signed by the President and the implementation of the tax
12We ﬁnd roughly the same results alternatively estimate the anticipation eﬀects for, say, K =1 0 ,a n dp l o tt h e
impulse responses for anticipated shocks under alternative assumptions regarding their anticipation lag.
14liability changes according to these laws. This identiﬁcation scheme does not take into account that
the private economy might have perceived the introduction of tax bills even before they became law.
Such perceptions may occur due to promises made during election campaigns, commitments made
in speeches, policy announcements etc. If such considerations are signiﬁcant, our results regarding
the existence of anticipation eﬀects and the diﬀerential impact of anticipated and unanticipated tax
shocks would be questionable.
We examine the relevance of this issue by investigating whether there is any systematic evidence
of responses to leads of surprise tax shocks. If the public had good information about tax changes
before their implementation, we should ﬁnd that these “anticipated surprise tax shocks” give rise to
much the same adjustment of the economy as the tax shocks that we identify as anticipated on the
basis of the timing convention. We estimate the following model:









t+i + et (3)
which allows for anticipation eﬀects of surprise tax shocks.
Figure 5 illustrates the impact of a one percentage point decrease in τu
t+6 on output and on
investment. For comparison, this ﬁgure also shows the estimates of the impact of anticipated tax
changes from this regression. In contrast to the impact of the impact of anticipated tax shocks
identiﬁed using the timing convention, we ﬁnd no evidence that surprise tax shocks impact on output
or investment prior to their implementation. Thus, there is little evidence to suggest that surprise tax
changes were systematically anticipated by the private sector. This does not preclude the possibility
that speciﬁc surprise tax changes were anticipated nor that some of the anticipated tax changes were
expected before they became law. For example, ERTA 1981 was proposed prior to Reagan’s election
and RA 1964 was proposed by Kennedy already in 1962. On the other hand, agents may have been
skeptical about the likelihood that these proposals were actually to be implemented before they
became laws. In any case, the evidence presented here is supportive of our timing based assumptions
regarding the measurement of anticipated tax shocks when evaluated across tax changes.
154 Robustness Analysis
This section provides a detailed robustness analysis. We wish to examine whether the ﬁndings
regarding the stimulating impact of implemented tax cuts and the pre-implementation negative
impact of anticipated tax cuts are sensitive to key aspects of our analysis.
4.1 Exogeneity of the Tax Shocks
The ﬁrst issue that we address is endogeneity of the tax liability changes. The narrative account
identiﬁcation of ﬁscal shocks that we have adopted does address endogeneity and we eliminated
all tax liability changes that Romer and Romer (2007) categorize as endogenous responses to the
current or projected state of the economy. However, one may still worry that this does not completely
eliminate the possibility that there is some endogeneity left in the tax changes that these authors
deem exogenous.
Ideally one would wish to examine the exogeneity of each single tax act in isolation but this is not
feasible statistically. Instead, we group the tax liability changes according to their motivation, that
is whether they were ideologically based or introduced to address deﬁcit concerns, and according to
whether they were anticipated or not. We test for predictability of the tax liability changes using
an ordered probit approach. Let b τs
t measure the tax liability change of type s announced at date t
where s refers to the motivation of the tax change and to whether it refers to a surprise tax change
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−1 if b τs
t < 0
0 if b τs
t =0
1 if b τs
t > 0
⎫
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎬
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎭
Thus, ys
t is a dummy variable that takes on on the value −1 when tax cuts are announced, 0
when there are no tax liability changes, and the value 1 when tax increases are announced. We then
test whether this variable is predictable on the basis of past data on the vector of observables Xt
(output, consumption, investment, hours worked and real wages) using ordered probit regressions.
13Since the hypothesis is that preannounced tax changes aﬀect the economy before the implementaiton date, it is
important that the tax liability hanges are dated by the announcement dates rather than the implementation dates.
16Since most of the variables in Xt are trending, these tests are carried out using detrended values of
Xt and each regression allows for 4 lags of Xt to enter the probit regressions.14
Table 1 reports the values of likelihood ratio tests that the coeﬃcients pertaining to the lags
of Xt are all equal to zero and the corresponding p-values of these statistics. The hypothesis that
announcements of tax liability changes taken as one group are predictable can be rejected at the 95
percent level indicating lack of predictability of the tax changes. When we look at the subsets of
the tax liability changes, the evidence in favor of exogeneity is very strong for ideologically based
changes in taxes regardless of their timing. Taken as one group or separated into surprise tax
changes or anticipated tax changes, the p-values of the test that lags of Xt have no predictive power
for ideologically based tax liability changes are all above 99 percent. Thus, we ﬁnd no evidence to
indicate that changes in taxes motivated by long term growth, fairness, or other ideological reasons
can be predicted.
The results for deﬁcit driven tax changes are instead more mixed. When we look at this type of
tax changes without distinguishing between the announcement of concurrent or future tax changes,
the p-value of the likelihood ratio test statistic is 48.2 percent. Decomposing these tax changes by
the timing, the p-value for non-predictability of unanticipated tax changes is above 99 percent while
it is 9.5 percent for the announcements of future tax changes. However, as far as the latter regression
is concerned, there is no single element of the vector of lagged values of Xt that individually has any
predictive power for ys
t. Thus, the evidence against the hypothesis that announcements of future
deﬁcit driven tax shocks are exogenous is, at best, weak.
We take a conservative approach to these results. Although the evidence against exogeneity of
the tax changes is at best only mild as far as pre-announced deﬁcit driven tax liability changes are
concerned, we repeat the estimation of the impact of tax changes using only ideologically based
tax acts (see Table A.1 for the classiﬁcation of the tax shocks according to the motivation of their
introduction). Figure 6 shows the impulse responses for this alternative tax shock measure. The
results are robust. We ﬁnd a slightly smaller impact of surprise tax changes than the benchmark
14We repeated our analysis using lower and higher order lag polynomials of Xt, using linear regressions, and using
simple probits (which test for endogeneity of the timing of the tax announcements). The results were in line with those
reported here.
17estimates (although the estimates are within the conﬁdence intervals of the benchmark estimates at
most forecast horizons) but the ﬁnding that anticipated tax shocks give rise to a pre-implementation
drop in output and in investment is, if anything, even stronger when deﬁcit driven tax changes are
eliminated. In particular, we now ﬁnd a 7 percent drop in aggregate investment 4 quarters before
the implementation of the tax cut as compared to 4 percent in the benchmark case. Thus, while
deﬁcit driven tax changes may be partially endogenous, eliminating them from the sample does not
overturn the key results of our analysis.
4.2 Stability Across Tax Acts
Another potential problem is that the results may derive from particular tax acts rather than being
robust across tax acts. High sensitivity to particular tax acts would indicate that the results cannot
be viewed as general, but derive from features special to particular tax acts such as the economic
circumstances under which they were introduced.
We examine this issue by eliminating particular tax acts from the sample. Three tax acts stand
out as particularly important: The Kennedy tax initiative (the Revenue Act of 1964, RA 1964 in
short), the Reagan tax act (ERTA 1981), and the Bush tax initiatives (the Economic Growth and
Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001 and the Jobs and Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of
2003, EGTRRA 2001 and JGTRRA 2003). These tax acts included large changes in tax liabilities
and also included several pre-announced changes in taxes. They are therefore prime candidates for
having particularly important consequences for our results and, thus, we examine how the results of
our exercise are sensitive to their elimination. We estimate the following regression:
Xt = A + Bt+ C (L)Xt−1 + D(L)b τu







t and b τa
t,i denote the tax shocks when we eliminate the tax liability changes (i.e. when we
set these tax shocks equal to 0) associated with either the Kennedy tax act, the Reagan tax act, or
the Bush tax acts.
The results for output, investment and real wages are reported in Figure 7 together with the
benchmark estimates and their conﬁdence intervals. Exclusion of ERTA 1981 implies slightly smaller
responses of output and investment but their shapes are very similar to the benchmark estimates.
18The most signiﬁcant impact of eliminating ERTA 1981 is that we ﬁnd a much larger real wage increase
to implemented anticipated tax cuts. Excluding RA 1964 has little consequence at all apart from the
real wage response to surprise tax cuts being less strong than in the benchmark case. Finally, when
we eliminate EGTRRA 2001 and JGTRRA 2003 we ﬁnd even larger output, investment and real wage
increases after surprise tax cuts than in the benchmark regressions while the eﬀects of anticipated tax
cuts are basically unaﬀected. In summary, although the quantitative impact of tax shocks depends
somewhat on the tax acts that are considered, the main results are robust to eliminating particular
tax acts.
We also note that we ﬁnd a consistent tendency for the real wage to increase during the pre-
implementation period in response to an anticipated tax cut. This result is important because it
addresses indirectly a concern that the estimated pr e - i m p l e m e n t a t i o nd r o pi na c t i v i t yd e r i v e sf r o m
lack of control for monetary policy variables (an issue that we examine in detail below). In particular,
since the ERTA 1981 coincided with the Volcker disinﬂation, one might worry that our results are
sensitive to the omission of monetary policy variables. However, not only do we ﬁnd that the results
are robust to eliminating this tax act, but the rise in the real wage also appears at odds with this
hypothesis. The reason is that standard monetary models would predict that the real wage should
decline in response to a contractionary monetary policy shock (such as the Volcker experiment) due
to the ensuing increase in the markup. We ﬁnd instead a rise in the real wage which lends no support
to this hypothesis.
4.3 Permanent vs. Temporary Tax Changes
The tax shock measure that we study aggregates together tax liability changes that were meant to
be permanent and tax changes meant to be temporary. In theory one would like to treat these tax
changes separately although the distinction in practice is less clear-cut since tax changes that were
meant to be permanent have occasionally been reversed subsequently (and in some cases, tax changes
meant to be temporary have subsequently been extended).
Nevertheless, it is of interest to examine whether this distinction matters for the results. Table
A.1 records the persistence of the tax liability changes and we note that eliminating temporary
tax changes corresponds to removing in total 10 tax liability changes from the sample out of which
19the Jobs and Growth Relief Tax Reconciliation Act of 2003 is the most important one. Figure 8 shows
the responses of aggregate output, consumption and investment to the tax shocks when we consider
only those tax changes that were explicitly meant to be permanent. The results are qualitatively
very similar to those that we reported in Section 3. Quantitatively, we ﬁnd a larger response of
output and its components to surprise tax changes when we consider only permanent tax changes,
a ﬁnding that appears natural. The impact of anticipated tax shocks is also quite similar to the
benchmark results, although we now ﬁnd some evidence to suggest a pre-implementation drop in
private sector consumption. Nevertheless, as in the benchmark results, the anticipation eﬀects are
much more pronounced for output and investment than for consumption.
4.4 Other Structural Shocks
Finally, we consider whether our results are aﬀected by the lack of control for other structural shocks.
We wish to emphasize that lack of control for other structural shocks is only a concern due to small
sample considerations.
4.4.1 Monetary Policy Shocks
One of the largest sequence of tax shocks in our sample, the Reagan tax cuts, coincides with an
important monetary policy intervention, the Volcker disinﬂation. The deliberate disinﬂationary
period of the Volcker chairmanship took its course during the period November 1980 to June 1982
(see Goodfriend and King, 2005). During this period, interest rates were hiked and by mid-1981
the federal funds rate peaked at 19 percent while the Tbond rate peaked a few months later at
more than 15 percent. Thus, when Reagan signed the ERTA in August 1981, it was in the midst
of the Fed’s attempts to stabilize inﬂation. We have already provided evidence above in Section 4.1
that eliminating ERTA 1981 from the sample does not substantially alter the results. Therefore, we
are skeptical about contamination during this particular experiment, but this does not exclude the
possibility that there is a more systematic problem when omitting controls for monetary policy.
In order to address this issue we augment the VAR with variables that allow us to control for
monetary policy shocks and introduce identifying assumptions adopted in the SVAR literature to
derive estimates of the monetary policy shocks and their eﬀects. We estimate the following VAR:
20e Xt = A + Bt+ C (L) e Xt−1 + D(L)τu
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where e Xt consists of the following vector of variables:
e Xt =[ yt,i t,z t,r t,n t]
0
zt is a vector of variables consisting of the (annualized) inﬂation rate, and the commodity price
inﬂation rate, rt is the federal funds rate, and nt denotes non-borrowed reserves (see the Appendix
for precise deﬁnitions and sources). Given lack of data for non-borrowed reserves for the earliest part
of the sample, we restrict the sample period to 1959:1-2006:4. This VAR is estimated using 4 lags of
the vector of endogenous variables. This introduces a large number of parameters to be estimated
and for that reason we eliminate consumption from the VAR. For the same reason, we set R =6 .
We assume that the interest rate is aﬀected contemporaneously by all the variables in the VAR
apart from non-borrowed reserves. We also allow the interest rate to react contemporaneously to
innovations to the tax shocks. The variables ordered before the interest rate in the VAR (i.e. all but
non-borrowed reserves) are assumed not to react contemporaneously to monetary policy shocks while
non-borrowed reserves is not constrained this way. These assumptions identify the monetary policy
shock as the innovation to the federal funds rate given a Cholesky decomposition of the covariance
matrix of et, see Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans (1996).
Figure 9 illustrates the impact of the tax shocks on output, investment, inﬂation, and the federal
funds rate. The results are very similar to the benchmark estimates. Interestingly, we ﬁnd that the
federal funds rate initially decreases in response to a surprise cut in taxes but then eventually returns
to its normal level 1.5-2 years after the tax cut. As in the benchmark estimates, the anticipated tax
cut gives rise to a pre-implementation drop in aggregate output and investment as well as in the
inﬂation rate and the nominal interest rate. The associated drop in aggregate investment during the
pre-implementation period is slightly larger than in the benchmark estimates of Section 3 while the
output drop is slightly smaller.
All in all, we ﬁnd a remarkable degree of robustness of the benchmark results. Thus, our estimates
of the impact of tax policy shocks do not appear contaminated by the lack of control for monetary
policy variables.
214.4.2 Government Spending
One may also worry about possible correlations of the tax changes with other ﬁscal policy shocks.
In particular, it is possible that the results are sensitive to in-sample correlation with shocks to ﬁscal
spending. We address this issue in the same fashion as above by controlling directly for government
spending shocks. We estimate the following VAR:
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where b Xt is the following vector of variables:
b Xt =[ gt,v t,y t,c t,i t]
0
The variable gt denotes gross federal purchases of goods and services, and vt denotes federal
revenues (both measured in real per capita terms, see the appendix for precise deﬁnitions). As
in Burnside, Eichenbaum and Fisher (2004) and Ramey (2008), the ﬁscal VAR includes controls
for (scaled) Ramey and Shapiro (1998) war dummies augmented with a 9/11 dummy as in Ramey
(2008). These dummies, captured by Wit, control for changes in federal military spending associated
with the Korean war, the Vietnam war, the Carter-Reagan military buildup, and 9/11. The war
dummies are equal to zero at all dates apart from 1950:3 for W1t, 1965:1 for W2t, 1980:1 for W3t and
2001:3 for W4t.W e n o r m a l i z e W1,1950:3 =1while following Ramey (2008), we set W2,1965:1 =0 .3,
W3,1980:1 =0 .1 and W4,2001:3 =0 .1, see also Burnside, Eichenbaum and Fisher (2004). Government
spending shocks are thus measured by the war dummies which provides a symmetric treatment to the
narrative approach of the measurement of the tax shocks. One slight worry is changes government
spending may also be associated with anticipation eﬀects. It is beyond the scope of this paper to
evaluate this problem but Ramey (2008) provides some evidence of the relevance of this issue.
The responses to a 1 percent tax cut when we control for government spending are reported
in Figure 10. The impact on output, consumption, and investment are practically identical to the
benchmark case. An anticipated tax cut gives rise to a pre-implementation drop in output and in
investment while consumption is roughly constant throughout the pre-implementation period. As
in the benchmark estimates, once taxes are eventually cut, there is a signiﬁcant rise in output and
its components. Thus, we ﬁnd no evidence to suggest that our results are contaminated by lack of
22control for government spending shocks.
Finally, we note that an unanticipated tax shock is associated with a temporary drop in govern-
ment spending, a ﬁnding that would be consistent with a “starving the beast” hypothesis regarding
the government spending eﬀects of tax cuts. This result, however, is sensitive to the inclusion of
changes in tax liabilities that are related to concerns about inherited government deﬁcits. Elimi-
nating these tax changes, we ﬁnd that government spending increases after a cut in taxes which is
consistent with the estimates of Romer and Romer (2009).
5 Tax Shocks and the U.S. Business Cycle
We now examine if the tax shocks have had important business cycle consequences. We carry out
this analysis using a counterfactual framework. In particular, we simulate the estimated VAR process
setting the vector b et equal to zero and using the point estimates of the estimated parameter vectors.
The resulting time-series for the observables are then Hodrick-Prescott ﬁltered (assuming a value
of the smoothing parameter of 1600). These counterfactual time-series are then compared with the
actual time series for the observables.
The results of this exercise using the benchmark VAR are reported in Figure 11. We show the
counterfactual time series for output, consumption and investment for three diﬀerent simulations.
In the ﬁrst simulation we allow only for surprise tax shocks thus setting τa
t,i =0for all t and all
i =0 ,1,..,K. These results are reported in panel A. In the second case we allow only for anticipated
tax shocks thus setting τu
t =0for all t. These results are shown in panel B. Finally, in the third
simulation, we allow for both types of tax shocks. In all cases, the counterfactual time series are
shown with thick lines while the actual time series are illustrated with the lighter lines. In each
ﬁgure, grey areas illustrate recessions according to the NBER datings.
Both anticipated and unanticipated tax shocks have provided important impulses to the business
cycle. Surprise tax changes were important impulses to the business cycle during three episodes.
During the early to mid 1960’s, the 2.55 percent tax liability cut contained in RA of 1964 provided a
major stimulus to the economy which accounts for a large fraction of the boom in the U.S. economy
during the mid 1960’s. The 1.23 percent tax cut contained in the Revenue Act of 1971 contributed to
the pre-OPEC I boom of the U.S. economy in the early 1970’s. Finally, the 2.86 percent tax liability
23cut associated with JGTRRA 2003 provided a major boost to the economy in the mid 2000’s.
Anticipated tax liability changes were particularly relevant impulses to the business cycle dur-
ing the early 1980’s recession, the expansion that followed thereafter, and during the early 2000’s.
Particularly interesting is the 1980’s episode where we ﬁnd that ERTA 1981 and the Social Secu-
rity Amendments of 1977 together had a large impact on the U.S. economy. The Social Security
Amendments of 1977 (signed by Carter in December 1977) included a 0.56 percent tax increase im-
plemented in 1981. This tax liability change had an expansionary eﬀect on the economy prior to its
implementation but provided a negative stimulus once implemented in 1981. ERTA 1981, signed by
Reagan in August 1981, was associated with major tax cuts implemented gradually from 1982 to
1984. These anticipated tax cuts had a negative impact on the U.S. economy from late 1981 up till
the end of 1983, the same time as the negative eﬀects of the Social Security Amendments of 1977
were setting in. When the Reagan tax cuts were eventually implemented through 1982 to 1984, it
provided a major stimulus to the economy during the mid 1980’s. Together, these anticipated tax
cuts therefore stimulated the economy prior to 1981, gave rise to a contractionary eﬀects from 1981
to late 1983, and helped the economy recover thereafter. Quantitatively, our results indicate that
the early 1980’s recession was to a large extent caused by ﬁscal policy rather than induced by tight
monetary policy during the Volcker monetary regime.
Anticipation eﬀects are also relevant in the case of EGTRRA 2001 and JGTRRA 2003 signed
by Bush in June 2001 and in May 2003, respectively. The former introduced a 0.80 percent cut in
tax liabilities in the ﬁrst quarter of 2002 while the latter introduced anticipated tax increases in the
third quarter of 2004 (a 1.70 percent increase) and in the ﬁrst quarter of 2005 (a 0.56 increase). In
agreement with the simulations of House and Shapiro (2006), we ﬁnd that the anticipation eﬀects
of the ﬁrst of these tax acts contributed to the slow recovery from the 2001 U.S. recession, while
the implementation of the tax cut helped stimulate the economy from 2002 onwards. Ironically, the
anticipation eﬀects associated with the tax increases incorporated in JGTRRA 2003 further stimu-
lated the economy during the pre-implementation period (2003q2 - 2004q3) until its implementation
eventually starts having a negative impact from the end of 2004 onwards.15
15Note that we exclude parts of the tax changes in EGTRRA 2001 since Romer and Romer (2007) categorize the
temporary tax cut as an endogenous response to the state of the business cycle.
24When we allow for both types of tax shocks, see panel C, we ﬁnd that they have accounted
for around 20 percent of the in-sample variance of output and its components at business cycle
frequencies. Moreover, the correlation between the counterfactual time-series and the actual time-
series is high (around 56 percent for output, and 48 percent for consumption and investment). Thus,
we conclude that tax shocks play a major role as business cycle impulses, a ﬁnding that is in line
with McGrattan (1994).
Perhaps the most controversial result of this exercise is the importance of anticipated tax changes
for the early 1980’s recession. To establish the robustness of this result, Figure 12 reports the
counterfactual time-series for output based on the VAR in equation (4) where we control for monetary
policy. In this ﬁgure we also show the counterfactual output series that derives from allowing only for
monetary policy shocks. Our results are robust. At the trough of the early 1980’s contraction, output
is 4.6 percent below trend. According to the benchmark estimates, the tax shocks by themselves give
rise to a 3.3 percent drop in output and the anticipated tax cuts account for almost all of this drop.
When we reestimate the VAR allowing for monetary variables, tax shocks give rise to a 2.6 percent
drop in output again with most of the action coming from anticipated tax shocks. By contrast,
the monetary policy shocks account for a maximum one percent drop in output. Moreover, in the
counterfactual experiment, the tax shocks can account for 27 percent of the output variance when
we introduce monetary variables in the VAR, and estimate that is even higher than the benchmark
estimate. Thus, the ﬁnding that tax shocks were key for accounting for the early 1980’s recession is
robust and is not due to lack of control for monetary policy shocks.
6C o n c l u s i o n s
We have investigated the dynamic eﬀects of tax liability changes in the U.S. during the postwar
period. We distinguished between anticipated and unanticipated tax shocks on the basis of a timing
convention. In particular, we assume that tax shocks that were introduced more than 90 days after
they became law were anticipated while tax liability changes implemented within 90 days of becoming
law are classiﬁed as surprise tax shocks. We have documented that unanticipated tax cuts give rise
to a major stimulus to the economy which is reﬂected in persistent increases in output, consumption,
investment and, to a smaller extent, hours worked. Anticipated tax cuts also stimulate the economy
25once taxes are cut, but during the pre-implementation period, we ﬁnd that output, investment
and hours worked drop while consumption is roughly unchanged. A number of earlier studies have
documented little impact of tax announcements on consumption until taxes are eventually changed,
a ﬁnding that is consistent with our results. The ﬁnding of important anticipation eﬀects on output,
investment and hours worked is new to the literature, however. Moreover, we showed through
extensive robustness analysis that these results do not derive from special assumptions that we
made, nor that they are caused by endogeneity of the tax changes or by missing control for other
popular structural shocks.
Tax shocks have provided important impulses to the U.S. business cycle. In particular, we
showed that the two tax shocks have been important for several business cycle episodes in the U.S.
Particularly interesting may be our ﬁnding that tax changes were key for understanding the early
1980’s recession and the mid-1980’s expansion of the U.S. economy. The tax shocks altogether can
account for around 20-25 percent of the in-sample variance of (detrended) output, an estimate that
is at least as large as the contribution of other popular candidates for business cycle impulses.
Our results regarding the presence of anticipation eﬀects have important consequences. First,
it provides some empirical evidence towards which theories of anticipation eﬀects can be evaluated.
Preexisting evidence has been scarce on this since it has mainly been concerned with consumption
responses to pre-announced tax changes and has found little impact on consumption of such tax
announcements (until they become implemented). Therefore, our results regarding the output, in-
vestment, and labor market impact of tax announcements provide some valuable ﬁndings that one
can use for model evaluation. Mertens and Ravn (2010a) carry out such an exercise. Secondly, our
results may also have some relevance for the recent interest into the “news” view of business cycles,
see e.g. Beaudry and Portier (2004, 2006), Cochrane (1994), Danthine, Donaldson and Johnsen
(1998), den Haan and Kaltenbrunner (2009), or Jaimovich and Rebelo (2006). An important ob-
stacle to empirical tests for a news driven business cycle theory is that expectations are inherently
diﬃcult to estimate as they are unobserved by the econometrician, but we overcome this diﬃculty
in our application to ﬁscal policy. Our ﬁnding that a pre-announced tax cut gives rise to a pre-
implementation contraction in the economy may be important for understanding how news shocks
help shape ﬂuctuations in the economy.
26It would be interesting to extend our analysis to other parts of ﬁscal policy. Ramey (2008)
provides some ﬁrst evidence that anticipation eﬀects may account for some of the more puzzling recent
ﬁndings about the impact of government spending shocks that derive from VAR based measures of
ﬁscal shocks. In particular, she shows that the ﬁscal shocks identiﬁed by VAR based methods (that
rely on decision lags for identiﬁcation) appear to be predictable on the basis of publicly available
forecasts of changes in ﬁscal policy. Moreover, by simulating a DSGE model she shows that ignoring
such anticipation eﬀects may lead to seriously biased estimates of the impact of ﬁscal policy shocks.
It would therefore be interesting to examine also whether there are signs of such anticipation eﬀects
in the data using similar methods to those that we have proposed in this paper.
7 References
Auerbach, Alan J., 1989, “Tax Reform and Adjustment Costs: The Impact on Investment and
Market Value”, International Economic Review vol.30(4), 939-962.
Beaudry, Paul, and Franck Portier, 2004, “An Exploration into Pigou’s Theory of Cycles”, Journal
of Monetary Economics vol.51(6), 1183-1216.
Beaudry, Paul, and Franck Portier, 2006, “Stock Prices, News, and Economic Fluctuations”, Amer-
ican Economic Review vol.96(4), 1293-1307.
Blanchard, Olivier J., 1981, “Output, the Stock Market, and Interest Rates”, American Economic
Review vol.71(1), 132-143.
Blanchard, Olivier J., and Roberto Perotti, 2002, “An Empirical Investigation of the Dynamic Ef-
fects of Changes in Government Spending and Taxes on Output”, Quarterly Journal of Economics
vol.117(4), 1329-1368.
Burnside, Craig, Martin Eichenbaum and Jonas D. M. Fisher, 2004, “Fiscal Shocks and Their Con-
sequences”, Journal of Economic Theory 115, 89-117.
Christiano, Lawrence, Martin Eichenbaum, and Charles Evans, 1996, “The Eﬀects of Monetary
Policy Shocks: Evidence from the Flow of Funds”, Review of Economics and Statistics 78(1), 16-34.
27Cochrane, John, 1994, “Shocks”, Carnegie-Rochester Series on Public Policy 41, 295-364.
Danthine, Jean Pierre, John B. Donaldson and Thore Johnsen, 1998, “Productivity Growth, Con-
sumer Conﬁdence and the Business Cycle”, European Economic Review 42, 1113-1140.
Den Haan, Wouter J., and Georg Kaltenbrunner, 2009, “Anticipated Growth and Business Cycles
in Matching Models”, Journal of Monetary Economics 56(3), 309-27.
Goodfriend, Marvin, and Robert G. King, 2005, “The Incredible Volcker Disinﬂation”, Journal of
Monetary Economics 52(5), 981-1015.
Hall, Robert E., 1971, “The Dynamic Eﬀects of Fiscal Policy in an Economy with Foresight”, Review
of Economic Studies 38, 229-244.
Heim, Bradley T., 2007, “The Eﬀect of Tax Rebates on Consumption Expenditures: Evidence from
State Tax Rebates”, National Tax Journal, 685-710.
House, Christopher L., and Matthew D. Shapiro, 2006, “Phased-In Tax Cuts and Economic Activity”,
American Economic Review 96(4), 1835-1849.
Jaimovich, Nir, and Sergio T. Rebelo, 2006, “Can News About the Future Drive the Business Cycle?”,
manuscript, Northwestern University.
Leeper, Eric M., Todd B. Walker and Shu-Chun Susan Yang, 2008, “Fiscal Foresight: Analytics and
Econometrics”, manuscript, Indiana University.
McGrattan, Ellen R., 1994, “The Macroeconomic Eﬀects of Distortionary Taxation”, Journal of
Monetary Economics 33(3), 573-601.
Mertens, Karel, and Morten O. Ravn, 2008, “The Aggregate Eﬀects of Anticipated and Unanticipated
U.S. Tax Policy Shocks: Theory and Empirics”, EUI working paper no. 2008/05.
Mertens, Karel, and Morten O. Ravn, 2010a, “Understanding the Aggregate Eﬀects of Anticipated
and Unanticipated Tax Policy Shocks”, forthcoming, Review of Economic Dynamics.
28Mertens, Karel, and Morten O. Ravn, 2010b, “Measuring the Impact of Fiscal Policy in the Face of
Anticipation: A Structural VAR Approach”, Economic Journal 120(May), 393-413.
Mountford, Andrew, and Harald Uhlig, 2009, “What are the Eﬀects of Fiscal Policy Shocks?”,
Journal of Applied Econometrics 24(6), 960-92..
Parker, Jonathan A., 1999, “The Reaction of Household Consumption to Predictable Changes in
Social Security Taxes”, American Economic Review vol.89(4), 959-973.
Perotti, Roberto, 2007, “Estimating the Eﬀects of Fiscal Policy in OECD Countries”, working paper
no. 276, IGIER.
Poterba, James M., 1988, “Are Consumers Forward Looking? Evidence from Fiscal Experiments”,
American Economic Review vol.78(2), 413-418.
Ramey, Valerie A., 2008, “Identifying Government Spending Shocks: It’s All in the Timing”, manu-
script, University of California, San Diego.
Ramey, Valerie A., and Matthew D. Shapiro, 1998, “Costly Capital Reallocation and the Eﬀects of
Government Spending”, Carnegie-Rochester Series on Public Policy vol.48, 145-194.
Romer, Christina D., and David H. Romer, 2007, “A Narrative Analysis of Postwar Tax Changes”,
manuscript, University of California, Berkeley.
Romer, Christina D., and David H. Romer, 2008, “A Narrative Analysis of Postwar Tax Changes”,
manuscript, University of California, Berkeley.
Romer, Christina D., and David H. Romer, 2009, “Do Tax Cuts Starve the Beast? The Eﬀect of
Tax Changes on Government spending”, Brookings Papers on Economic Activity (Spring).
Romer, Christina D., and David H. Romer, 2010, “The Macroeconomic Eﬀects of Tax Changes:
Estimates Based on a New Measure of Fiscal Shocks”, American Economic Review 100(3), 763-801.
Souleles, Nicholas S., 1999, “The Response of Household Consumption to Income Tax Refunds”,
American Economic Review vol.89(4), 947-958.
29Souleles, Nicholas S., 2002, “Consumer Response to the Reagan Tax Cut”, Journal of Public Eco-
nomics vol.85, 99-120.
Taylor, John B., 1993, Macroeconomic Policy in a World Economy, W.W. Norton: New York.
Yang, Shu-Chun Susan, 2005, “Quantifying Tax Eﬀects Under Policy Foresight”, Journal of Monetary
Economics 52(8), 1557-1168.
308A p p e n d i x 1 : D a t a : D e ﬁnitions and Sources
Table A.1: Tax Liability Changes
Name Signed Eﬀective Type Persistence Motivation Size
1. Social Security Amendments of 1947 August 1947 1950 Q1 Anticipated Permanent Deﬁcit 0.27
2. Revenue Act of 1948 April 1948 1948 Q2 Surprise Permanent Long run -3.74
April 1948 1948 Q3 Surprise Permanent Long run 1.83
3. Social Security Amendments of 1950 August 1950 1954 Q1 Anticipated Permanent Deﬁcit 0.35
4. Expiration of Excess Proﬁts and October 1951 1954 Q1 Anticipated Permanent Deﬁcit -0.35
Temporary Income Tax
5. Internal Revenue Code of 1954 August 1954 1954 Q3 Surprise Permanent Long run -1.13
August 1954 1954 Q4 Surprise Permanent Long run 0.72
6. Tax Rate Extension Act of 1958 June 1958 1958 Q3 Surprise Permanent Long run -0.11
7. Social Security Amendments of 1958 August 1958 1960 Q1 Anticipated Permanent Deﬁcit 0.36
8. Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1959 September 1959 1959 Q4 Surprise Temporary Deﬁcit 0.12
9. Social Security Amendments of 1961 Jun 1961 1963 Q1 Anticipated Permanent Deﬁcit 0.33
10. Changes in Depreciation Guidelines July 1962 1962 Q3 Surprise Permanent Long run -0.69
and Revenue Act of 1962 July 1962 1962 Q4 Surprise Permanent Long run 0.45
October 1962 1962 Q4 Surprise Permanent Long run -0.61
October 1962 1963 Q1 Surprise Permanent Long run 0.45
October 1962 1963 Q1 Surprise Permanent Long run 0.10
11. Revenue Act of 1964 February 1964 1964 Q2 Surprise Permanent Long run -2.55
February 1964 1964 Q3 Anticipated Permanent Long run 1.25
February 1964 1965 Q1 Anticipated Permanent Long run -0.65
12. Excise Tax Reduction of 1965 June 1965 1965 Q3 Surprise Permanent Long run -0.24
June 1965 1966 Q1 Anticipated Permanent Long run -0.23
13. Tax Adjustment Act of 1966 March 1966 1966 Q2 Surprise Permanent Long run 0.12
14. Public Law 90-26 June 1967 1967 Q3 Surprise Permanent Long run -0.66
June 1967 1967 Q4 Anticipated Permanent Long run 0.46
31Table A.1 continued
Name Signed Eﬀective Type Persistence Motivation Size
15. Social Security Amendments of 1967 January 1968 1971 Q1 Anticipated Permanent Deﬁcit 0.33
16. Tax Reform Act of 1969 December 1969 1971 Q1 Anticipated Permanent Long run -0.09
December 1969 1972 Q1 Anticipated Permanent Long run -0.09
17. Reform of Depreciation Rules January 1971 1971 Q1 Surprise Permanent Long run -0.25
18. Revenue Act of 1971 December 1971 1972 Q1 Surprise Permanent Long run -1.23
December 1971 1972 Q2 Anticipated Permanent Long run 0.55
19. 1972 Changes to Social Security October 1972 1978 Q1 Anticipated Permanent Deﬁcit 0.13
20. Tax Reform Act of 1976 October 1976 1976 Q4 Surprise Permanent Long run 0.13
October 1976 1977 Q1 Surprise Permanent Long run -0.04
21. Tax Reduction and May 1977 1977Q3 Surprise Permanent Long run -1.02
Simpliﬁcation Act of 1977 May 1977 1977Q4 Anticipated Permanent Long run 0.66
22. Social Security Amendments of 1977 December 1977 1979 Q1 Anticipated Permanent Long run 0.36
December 1977 1980 Q1 Anticipated Permanent Long run 0.06
December 1977 1981 Q1 Anticipated Permanent Long run 0.56
December 1977 1982 Q1 Anticipated Permanent Long run 0.05
23. Revenue Act of 1978 November 1978 1979 Q1 Surprise Permanent Long run -0.77
2 4 .C r u d eO i lW i n d f a l lP r o ﬁt April 1980 1980 Q2 Surprise Temporary Long run 0.30
Tax Act of 1980 April 1980 1981 Q1 Anticipated Temporary Long run 0.13
April 1980 1982 Q1 Anticipated Temporary Long run 0.13
25. Economic Recovery Tax Act August 1981 1981 Q3 Surprise Permanent Long run -0.84
of 1981 August 1981 1981 Q4 Surprise Permanent Long run 0.56
August 1981 1982 Q1 Anticipated Permanent Long run -1.53
August 1981 1983 Q1 Anticipated Permanent Long run -1.69
August 1981 1984 Q1 Anticipated Permanent Long run -1.28
26. Tax Equity and Fiscal September 1982 1983 Q1 Anticipated Permanent Deﬁcit 0.78
Responsibility Act of 1982
32Name Signed Eﬀective Type Persistence Motivation Size
27. Social Security Amendments April 1983 1984 Q1 Anticipated Permanent Deﬁcit 0.32
of 1983 April 1983 1985 Q1 Anticipated Permanent Deﬁcit 0.21
April 1983 1986 Q1 Anticipated Permanent Deﬁcit 0.10
April 1983 1988 Q1 Anticipated Permanent Deﬁcit 0.31
April 1983 1990 Q1 Anticipated Permanent Deﬁcit 0.18
28. Deﬁcit Reduction Act of 1984 July 1984 1984 Q3 Surprise Permanent Deﬁcit 0.20
29. Tax Reform Act of 1986 October 1986 1986 Q4 Surprise Permanent Long run 0.50
October 1986 1987 Q1 Surprise Permanent Long run -0.16
October 1986 1987 Q3 Anticipated Permanent Long run -0.42
October 1986 1988 Q1 Anticipated Permanent Long run -0.15
30. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation December 1987 1988 Q1 Surprise Permanent Deﬁcit 0.22
Act of 1987
31. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation November 1990 1991 Q1 Surprise Permanent Deﬁcit 0.60
Act of 1990
32. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation August 1993 1993 Q3 Surprise Permanent Deﬁcit 1.02
Act of 1993 August 1993 1993 Q4 Surprise Permanent Deﬁcit -0.59
August 1993 1994 Q1 Anticipated Permanent Deﬁcit 0.19
33. Tax Payer Relief Act and August 1997 2000 Q1 Anticipated Permanent Deﬁcit 0.02
Balanced Budget Act of 1997 August 1997 2002 Q1 Anticipated Permanent Deﬁcit 0.01
34. Economic Growth and Tax Relief June 2001 2002 Q1 Anticipated Permanent Long run -0.80
Reconciliation Act of 2001
35. Jobs and Growth Tax Relief May 2003 2003 Q3 Surprise Temporary Long run -2.86
Reconciliation Act of 2003 May 2003 2004 Q3 Anticipated Temporary Long run 1.70
May 2003 2005 Q1 Anticipated Temporary Long run 0.56
Source: Romer and Romer, 2007, 2008 and Bureau of Economic Analysis. Tax liability changes with
more than 90 days diﬀerence between the signing of the legislation and their implementation
are classiﬁed as anticipated tax liability changes. Sizes are measured by the implied tax liability
impact divided by that quarter’s current price GDP at the annual rate.
33Table A.2: Deﬁnitions of Variables
Variable Deﬁnition Source
Output Nominal GDP divided by its implicit deﬂator and by Bureau of Economic Analysis
population
Consumption Consumers nominal expenditure divided by its Bureau of Economic Analysis
its deﬂator and by population
Investment Private sector gross investment divided by Bureau of Economic Analysis
its deﬂator and by population
Hours worked Product of hours per worker and civilian non-farm Bureau of Economic Analysis
employment divided by population combined with and Francis and Ramey
Francis and Ramey (2002) hours worked series. (2002)
Population Population above 16 years of age Bureau of Labor Statistics
Federal funds rate Eﬀective funds rate (annualized) Federal Reserve Bank
of St. Louis
Inﬂation rate Annualized quarter to quarter increase in implicit Bureau of Economic Analysis
GDP deﬂator
Nonborrowed reserves Non borrowed reserves, ﬁnal month of the quarter Federal Reserve Bank
of St. Louis
Commodity price inﬂation Annualized quarter to quarter increase in the Commodity Research
KR-CRB spot commodity price index Bureau
Government spending Sum of federal current expenditures, gross Bureau of Economic Analysis
investment expenditures, capital transfer payments
and net purchases of nonproduced assets divided by
its implicit deﬂator and by population
Government revenue Total federal receipts divided by government Bureau of Economic Analysis
spending deﬂator and by population
349 Appendix 2: Deriving the VAR model
Here we outline how the empirical VAR model can be obtained from a DSGE model. Suppose that labor income and
capital income tax rates are stochastic and given by the processes:
τn









where τn,τk ∈ [0,1) are constants that determine the long run unconditional means of the two tax rates. There are
two types of innovations to taxes, surprise shocks (εn
t and εk
t ) and anticipated tax shocks (ξn
t,b and ξk
t,b). The latter
are pre-announced b quarters in advance and ξi
t,0 denotes the anticipated tax shock to tax rate i which is implemented













. The innovations to the tax rates are allowed to be correlated but we assume that
εt and ξt,b are orthogonal.
The solution to a linear rational expectations model can be expressed as:
Zs = ΛZZs−1 + ΞZWs (8)
Ws = ΞWWs−1 + ΓWηs (9)
Us = ΛUZs−1 + ΞUWs (10)
where Zs is a vector of endogenous states, Ws is a vector of exogenous states, ηs a vector of innovations including the
tax shocks, and Us is a vector of controls. Let Ys be a vector of observables and suppose we wish to estimate how tax
innovations aﬀect the dynamics of this vector. This vector is assumed to be a subset (or linear combinations of) of the
set of controls and states. The solution for the observables, Ys can be expressed as:
Ys = ΛY Zs−1 + ΞY Ws (11)
It follows from equation (8) that:
Zs =( I − ΛZL)
−1 ΞZWs (12)
which converges under the condition that the roots of ΛZ are strictly less than one in modulus. Under the condition
that ΛY is invertible, equations (11) − (12) imply that
Ys = ΛY ΛZΛ−1






35Assume that dim(Y )=d i m( Z) so that there are as many innovations as measurement variables. From equation
(9) we have that:
Ws = ΓWηs + ΞWΓWηs−1 + Ξ2
WΓWηs−2 + ..
which converges given that ΞW has roots inside the unit circle. Inserting this into equation (??) we ﬁnd that:




A = ΛY ΛZΛ−1
Y ,B 0 = ΞY ΓW
Bi =
£






W ΓW for i ≥ 1
ΞW is a dampening matrix given as:
ΞW =
⎡

















Therefore, the roots of ΞW are less than or equal to one under the conditions that |ρn| < 1 and
¯ ¯ρk¯ ¯ < 1.

















. Thus, the process for the observables can be expressed as:













































i = BiHη,H ε =
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⎥ ⎥ ⎥
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36Table 1: Tests of Exogeneity of Tax Liability Changes
All “exogenous” tax changes
All Surprise Anticipated
Test statistic 10.77 3.545 17.97
P-value 0.952 0.999 0.589
Long run growth motivated tax changes
All Surprise Anticipated
Test statistic 8.051 6.255 5.838
P-value 0.992 0.999 0.999
Deﬁcit driven tax changes
All Surprise Anticipated
Test statistic 19.61 2.266 28.64
P-value 0.482 0.999 0.095
Notes: The table reports the outcomes of likelihood ratio
tests of the hypothesis that four lags of the vector Xt have
no predictive power for tax liability changes dated by their
announcements. The models are speciﬁed as ordered probits
and “P-value” is the probability of the test statistic under the
null of no predictability. The vector Xt includes linearly
detrended logarithms of output, investment, consumption,
hours worked (all in per adult terms) and real wages.






























Implementation Lag in Days
Figure 1: The Distribution of Implementation Lags Across Tax Liability Changes



























































Figure 2: Tax Liability Changes as Percent of Current Price GDP (the top panel illustrates
unanticipated tax changes, the middle panel illustrates anticipated tax changes dated at the
implementation date, the lower panel shows the implementation lag in quarters of the anticipated tax
changes censored at 16 quarters)
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Figure 3: The Impact of a 1 percent Tax Liability Cut (lines with circles indicates point estimates,
grey areas are 68 percent bootstrapped conﬁdence intervals)
























Figure 4: The Impact on Output of a 1 Percent Anticipated Tax Cut for Alternative Anticipation
Horizons
41Leads of Unanticipated Tax Shocks Anticipated Tax Shocks














































































Figure 5: The Impact of a 1 Percent Tax Cut Allowing for Anticipation of Surprise Tax Shocks
(the impulse responses are estimated from equation (3))
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Figure 6: The Impact of a 1 Percent Tax Cut Introduced for Long Run Growth Reasons
43Unanticipated Tax Cut Anticipated Tax Cut






































































































































Figure 7: Stability of Estimates Across Tax Acts
(the diagrams show the impact of a 1 percent tax liability cut when eliminating RA 1964,
ERTA 1981 or JGTRRA 2003 from the sample, respectively)
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Figure 8: The Impact of a 1 Percent Permanent Tax Cut
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Figure 9: The Impact of a 1 Percent Tax Cut Controlling for Monetary Variables
(the ﬁgure shows the estimates from equation 4)
46Unanticipated Tax Cut Anticipated Tax Cut




















































































































































Figure 10: The Impact of a 1 Percent Tax Cut Controlling for Government Spending
and Government Revenue (the ﬁgure shows the estimates from equation 5)
47Panel A: Surprise tax shocks Panel B: Anticipated tax shocks














































































































Figure 11: Counterfactual Analysis of US Business Cycles
(the ﬁgure illustrates HP-ﬁltered actual and simulated output, consumption, and investment. In panel A, equation
2 is simulated setting all shocks by the surprise tax shock equal to zero; In panel B, equation 2 is simulated setting
all but the anticipated tax shock equal to zero. Shaded areas indicate recessions according to the NBER datings)   
                                                                48P a n e lC :A l lt a xs h o c k s
























































(panel C illustrates the case where all shocks apart from the tax shocks are set
equal to zero)






































Figure 12: Counterfactual Output from the Monetary VAR
(the ﬁgure illustrates HP ﬁltered actual and simulated output series; the top ﬁgure illustrates output
when simulating the VAR in equation 4 allowing only for tax shocks; the bottom ﬁgure illustrates
output wen simulating the VAR in equation 4 allowing only for monetary policy shocks)
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